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Abstract 
Transaction costs for financial transactions are often high in developing countries. 
Borrowing costs are large for small loans. The costs of mobilizing, lending, and recovering 
funds are high for financial institutions. Attention has increasingly been placed on measur-
ing transaction costs and identifying ways to reduce them. 
The first section of this paper presents a conceptual framework of transaction costs 
for financial transactions. Empirical evidence is then summarized from several transaction 
costs studies of both financial institutions, and depositors and borrowers. The next section 
includes a discussion of ways to reduce transaction costs including examples drawn from 
several developing countries. The following section outlines some ways that donors can 
work to reduce transaction costs. A final section summarizes the paper. 
REDUCING THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: 
THEORY AND INNOVATIONS 
by 
Richard L Meyer 
Carlos E. Cuevas 
INTRODUCTION 
Transaction costs can be defined as the costs of transferring resources between 
markets or between participants in the same market. In the finance field, transaction costs 
refer to the resources required to transfer (lend) one unit (e.g. dollar, peso) of currency 
from a saver to a borrower, and recover that unit of currency at a later date plus some 
agreed interest charge. Interest and other charges represent the returns to the lender as 
compensation for the cost of mobilizing the funds, allocating them to borrowers, and 
recovering them through loan repayments. Unlike transactions in other markets, financial 
transactions always involve some risk because the contract is not completed until some 
future date when the loan is repaid. Credit rationing and loan collateral and collateral 
substitutes represent ways for the lender to reduce risks. 
Transaction costs for financial transactions are often high in developing countries. 
In some cases, the total borrowing costs for small rural loans are so high, in spite of 
subsidized interest rates, that borrowers prefer loans from informal rather than formal 
sources (Ahmed; Ladman). Furthermore the high transaction costs of financial institutions 
often exceed the spread authorized between cost of funds and maximum lending rates. 
Because of this situation, attention has increasingly been placed on measuring the magnitude 
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of these costs and on ways to reduce them in order to expand lending to priority clients and 
to improve the viability of financial institutions. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a simple conceptual framework for transac-
tion costs of financial transactions, to summarize some recent empirical evidence on 
transaction costs, and to suggest ways to reduce these costs. The next section presents the 
conceptual framework and the empirical estimates. The following section discusses ways to 
reduce high transaction costs. The final section offers some suggestions about contributions 
that donors can make to help developing nations to improve financial intermediation. 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION COSTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The Concept of Transaction Costs 
Financial transactions entail non-financial costs for all participants in the market, i.e., 
depositors, borrowers, and financial intermediaries. The level and distribution of these costs 
among the participants are affected by changes in technology, by changes in consumer 
preferences, by financial regulations, and by the internal efficiencies of financial institutions. 
A framework in which to conceptualize these costs is presented in Figure 1. "d" represents 
the deposit interest rate paid by the financial intermediary to the depositor. "i" represents 
the lending rate charged to borrowers. 
Depositors incur search and information costs to select a depository institution, and 
to perform account transactions (deposits, withdrawals). These costs correspond to "cs" in 
Figure 1. Therefore the net return received by depositors per unit of deposits is "d-c5". At 
the other end, borrowers also bear explicit and implicit costs of negotiating, obtaining and 
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repaying loans. These are represented as "c.,". For both borrowers and depositors, the 
opportunity costs of time may represent a significant component of c5 and c.,. 
Figure 1. Financial Transaction Costs 
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Non-financial transaction costs incurred by financial intermediaries may be classified 
into costs of mobilizing deposits (em), and costs of lending (G). The former correspond to 
resources (labor, capital, materials) utilized in handling deposit accounts, documentation, 
record-keeping, and issuing statements. Costs of lending refer to costs associated with loan 
processing, disbursement, monitoring, and recovery. Gathering information about potential 
borrowers, assessment of collateral and documentation are among these lending costs. The 
interest rate charged on loans represents the income earned by the financial intermediary 
to cover interest paid on deposits, costs of mobilizing funds, costs of lending, and a net 
surplus (N) or profits which may be positive or negative. 
In addition to the explicit resource costs of lending, financial intermediaries in 
developing countries often experience high risk costs, i.e. the implicit costs and explicit losses 
associated with loan default. Almost without exception, accounting provisions for loan 
delinquency and default are unrealistic, and are developed through diverse and usually 
undisclosed procedures. This fact introduces serious difficulties into the analysis of transac-
tion costs across institutions and countries. 
In summary, financial intermediaries are considered firms which use inputs of real 
resources to produce financial services (e.g., bookkeeping, loan evaluations, and deposit 
transactions), given a certain technology. Under this approach, financial assets as well as 
bank liabilities are considered bank outputs, to the extent that their production cause 
operating expenses. The treatment of deposits as a bank output is consistent with the "real 
resource model" approach to modelling the banking firm (Baltensperger), and it has been 
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accepted practice in recent empirical work (Benston, Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey; 
Cuevas, 1984; Hunter and Timme; Srinivasan). 
Measuring Transaction Costs of Financial Institutions 
Two different methodological approaches were used to estimate the transaction costs 
of financial institutions reported in this paper. The econometric estimation of bank cost 
functions was used with pooled time series/cross-section data in the studies reported for 
Bangladesh, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. A cost allocation method using bank 
accounting data was used for the estimates for the Philippines, Honduras, Niger, and Togo1• 
The methods are discussed only briefly here. More details can be found in Cuevas (1988b). 
The econometric cost-function approach uses the duality relationships between cost 
and production functions to infer properties of the production technology from the knowl-
edge of the cost function. Thus, this approach allows the estimation of parameters such as 
economies of scale and economies of joint production (scope), without making prior 
assumptions about the nature of the underlying production function. The analytical 
advantages of this method are partially offset by its large data requirements. A sufficient 
number of observations is required to allow enough degrees of freedom in the estimation. 
Moreover, even though it does not necessarily involve field data collection, the method does 
depend on the quality of the information available in financial statements and other bank 
records. 
1 The only other example of measured transaction costs in developing countries found 
in our literature search was by Saito and Villanueva. 
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The studies reported here all used the translogarithmic (translog) specification of the 
cost functions as it offers a number of attractive properties. The estimates obtained of 
overall economies of scale (ES) refer to the percentage change in cost when all bank 
outputs increase by a constant factor. If ES is less than 1, economies of scale exist since 
costs increase proportionally less than output. Partial economies of scale can also be 
calculated to determine the impact on costs of increasing just one output while holding the 
others constant. 
The alternative methods of measuring bank output have been a matter of concern 
in cost studies. The studies reviewed here have used two output definitions: (i) number of 
loans and number of deposit accounts, and (ii) value of loans and value of deposit balances. 
Outputs have been measured primarily as stocks, under the assumption that the flow of 
services is proportional to the stock, as well as due to the constraints of data availability. 
The heterogeneity of loan and deposit accounts has been recognized by introducing 
average loan-size and average deposit-size as control variables in the estimation. It can be 
assumed that, everything else constant, lenders perceive large loans as riskier ventures; 
hence it is hypothesized that the marginal cost of a loan is an increasing function of loan 
size. However, the increase in marginal cost is expected to be less than proportional to the 
increase in loan size, thus making the marginal cost per dollar lent a decreasing function of 
loan size. On the other hand, large deposit accounts are assumed for "preferred" customers 
who receive special or additional services thus representing higher costs for the financial 
intermediary. It is expected, therefore, that the marginal cost of handling deposit accounts 
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increases as deposit-size increases, while the marginal cost per dollar mobilized decreases 
with increases in the average deposit balance. 
The cost-allocation method involves the implicit assumption of a fixed-coefficient 
production function, unlike the econometric approach described above. As a consequence, 
returns to scale are assumed constant. The major data inputs required by the cost-allocation 
method are the financial statements for a sample of bank branches in a given time period 
(e.g., the most recent year), salary and wages of branch personnel, loan and deposit statistics 
for each branch for the corresponding time period, and the time allocation of bank employ-
ees. The latter data are obtained from field interviews with branch personnel. 
The basic assumption of the cost-allocation method is that non-personnel inputs used 
in the production of banking services are allocated to different activities in the same propor-
tion as are personnel costs. This method usually allows the researcher to obtain a detailed 
breakdown of the resource allocation in the institution. For example, through an appropri-
ate questionnaire, it is possible to determine the relative importance of loan evaluation, loan 
monitoring, and loan recovery activities, within the general classification of lending activities. 
A similar degree of detail can be acquired in the description of funds mobilization. Since 
it involves field interviews, the cost-allocation method is necessarily restricted to a rather 
small sample of bank branches, thereby limiting the statistical testing of results. On the 
other hand, it gives the researcher a better understanding of the activities and procedures 
performed by the institutions than would be obtained solely from secondary data. 
The results of the econometric studies for five banks in Bangladesh, two banks in 
Honduras, and one bank in the Dominican Republic are presented in Table 1. All estimat-
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ed parameters were evaluated at the geometric mean of all variables in the cost equations. 
Therefore, they represent the parameters for the "average branch", i.e. a hypothetical branch 
described by the geometric mean of all variables. 
Three banks, especially the public development bank of the Dominican Republic, 
show important economies of scale; therefore they would substantially benefit from an 
expansion in both lending and deposit activities. In all cases, the ES value will increase as 
loans and deposits expand indicating a U-shaped average cost surface. When feasible, 
therefore, banks showing constant returns to scale should realign service areas to expand 
small branches and shrink large branches to make their sizes approach the average branch 
size. 
An interesting finding in Table 1 concerns the estimates for partial economies of 
scale. Public development banks which typically emphasize lending with little attention to 
deposit mobilization show the largest potential cost advantages to the expansion of deposit 
mobilization. On the other hand, the commercial banks in Bangladesh and Honduras could 
profitably expand lending relative to deposit mobilization. This "unbalanced" output growth 
would emphasize the expansion of the financial services with the lowest value of partial 
economies of scale. 
The average and marginal costs of lending and deposit mobilization are also present-
ed in Table 1. Overall the Bangladesh banks showed lower average and marginal costs 
compared to the other banks. Two caveats are important in analyzing these findings. First, 
costs of lending and deposit mobilization cannot be simply added to arrive at the overall 
costs of intermediation. Adjustments must be made to account for the share of deposits in 
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the total pool of loanable funds. The costs of mobilizing other funds (e.g., borrowings from 
the central bank) are likely to be substantially lower, although not necessarily negligible. 
Second, low intermediation costs may not necessarily reflect efficient overall performance 
of the institution, whereas high intermediation costs may indeed reflect wasted resources. 
Studies undertaken on lending costs in six countries are summarized in Table 2. 
Bangladesh banks show relatively low lending costs compared to the other case studies 
reported. Even though the bank branches used in the Bangladesh studies are primarily rural 
and agricultural loans predominate in their portfolios, average costs of lending fluctuate 
between 1 percent and 4 percent. This cost range is comparable to the costs obtained for 
non-agricultural loans in other countries which appear substantially lower than agricultural 
loans. 
Specialized government banks show high loan-administration costs in all countries. 
The rather low administration costs of public development banks in the Philippines can be 
partially explained by the large scale of operations of the Philippines National Bank (PNB). 
PNB operations are based on relatively large loans to agribusinesses and agricultural trade 
enterprises, a factor that may also explain the low costs of the Bangladesh Krishi Bank 
(BKB). The relatively high costs revealed for the development bank in Niger, on the other 
hand, are due in part to the input delivery function it performs in addition to making and 
recovering loans. 
Table 3 includes data on loan recovery so that the potential trade-off between 
resources devoted to loan processing and loan recovery can be analyzed. The default rates 
were estimated based on past-due ratios with an opportunity cost of funds of 5 percent used 
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for all cases. The last column reports total noninterest costs of lending (ignoring the cost 
of funds mobilized). These rough calculations suggest that the nationalized commercial 
banks in Bangladesh and the Honduran public development banks have the highest rates. 
Private commercial banks in other countries tend to have the lowest costs. An implication 
of these results may be that the low cost of loan administration found in some banks before 
considering risks may indicate an insufficient amount of resources allocated to screening 
borrowers, supervising loans, and collecting outstanding loans. Therefore, lending costs may 
actually be too low in some cases and high loan delinquency and default is the result. 
Measuring Transaction Costs of Borrowers and Depositors 
A number of field surveys have been conducted in developing countries to measure 
borrower transaction costs. The results of nine of these studies are reported in Table 4. 
The results are reasonably comparable because a similar methodology was used for most 
of them. Data were obtained by direct interviews with borrowers in order to estimate the 
explicit non-interest costs incurred by them in the process of securing and repaying loans. 
Explicit costs consist primarily of transportation, lodging and meal expenses associated with 
trips to the bank office, and fees and other cash payments for documents and legal proce-
dures. Bribes and "tea money" are important cash costs in some cases. Implicit costs 
correspond to the opportunity cost spent by farmers in negotiating their loans. With the 
exception of the Philippines, the data were collected during periods of low nominal interest 
rates intended to provide subsidized credit to small and medium-sized farmers. 
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Panel A presents transaction costs as a percent of loan amount, while in panel B 
these transaction costs have been expressed as a proportion of explicit-interest charges. This 
proportion indicates the relative importance of transaction costs as a tax on the price of 
liquidity. These indicators are reported for the sample average of each case, and for three 
loan-size categories defined for each study. 
On average, transaction costs as a percent of the loan amount vary between about 
1 percent (Niger) and almost 22 percent (Bangladesh). The magnitudes across countries 
and loan-size categories range from 0.2 percent to almost 30 percent. There is a striking 
contrast in Panel A between the results for Bangladesh and for other countries. This is due 
to the unusually small loan sizes in Bangladesh compared to other countries. This contrast 
is also reflected in Panel B, where transaction costs are expressed as a percent of explicit-
interest charges. Transaction costs for Bangladesh on average are almost twice as large as 
the explicit interest charged on loans, whereas in the other countries the transaction costs 
tax represents (at the sample average) between 4 percent and 85 percent of explicit interest. 
Another special case is Niger where the low borrowing transaction costs are explained by 
an undeveloped and deficient credit delivery system, where conventional loan processing 
practices do not exist (Cuevas, Graham and Masini). Therefore the burden of transaction 
costs lies heavily on the institutions involved, rather than on the ultimate borrowers. 
With the exception of Peru and the Philippines, the findings presented in Table 4 
suggest that borrowing transaction costs play an important role as implicit prices in these 
credit markets. Their magnitude certainly cannot be ignored by prospective borrowers. The 
results also show the regressive distributional effects of borrowing transaction costs. In all 
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cases the incidence of transaction costs by loan-size category is clearly regressive with small 
loans bearing high costs and large loans entailing the lowest transaction costs as a percent 
of the loan. Hence, the intended effect of credit policies to promote a low and relatively 
uniform interest rate among borrowers is not attained. Instead, a skewed, regressive 
structure of total borrowing costs (interest rate plus transaction costs) is obtained. Even 
when the administered rates are set so that small loans are charged a lower rate than 
medium or large loans, as was the case in Costa Rica and Ecuador, transaction costs more 
than offset the explicit interest-rate differential resulting in higher total credit costs for the 
intended beneficiaries of the policy. 
Compared to borrowing costs, there is much less systematic analysis available about 
depositor transaction costs. Generally it is expected that these costs are fairly low since 
there are incentives for most financial institutions to expand by providing attractive deposit 
services to attract more depositors. But it is also true that in many countries the network 
of financial institutions is not well developed so many rural residents live long distances 
from deposit-taking institutions. Travel time and costs, therefore, are expected to discourage 
the holding of deposits in banks. Furthermore, some specialized lending institutions with 
dispersed branch networks are prohibited from taking deposits. 
Guerrero analyzed depositor behavior in the public agricultural bank (Banco 
Agricola) in the Dominican Republic after it began to take deposits for the first time in it's 
loan branches. He discovered that many depositors lived over 20 kilometers from the bank 
branch and spent 1 to 2 hours travelling to it. However, they chose to deposit with the 
branch because in some areas it was the only one available, and because they enjoyed 
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economies of scope by obtaining both loan and deposit services from the same institution. 
Not surprisingly, transaction costs were negatively associated with size of account balance 
and the level of account activity (deposits and withdrawals). 
Khalily, Meyer, and Hushak analyzed transaction costs as one of the determinants 
of district level deposits in nationalized commercial banks in Bangladesh. An index 
representing number of bank branches and rural transportation facilities was constructed to 
represent transaction costs. The index was found to be negatively associated with bank 
deposits implying that more widely distributed bank branches and/ or more transportation 
facilities would decrease transaction costs and thereby increase rural bank deposits. 
Explanations for High Transaction Costs 
The data reported in the previous section show a wide range in the non-financial 
transaction costs experienced by depositors, borrowers, and financial intermediaries in 
developing countries. In some cases the costs are quite high compared to standards in 
developed countries. In some cases, however, the costs appear to be too low as in the case 
of low loan administration costs that may contribute to poor loan recovery. 
A number of factors contribute to high transaction costs. First, to a great extent the 
country's level of development determines the degree of development and maturity of the 
financial system. It influences the type of financial technologies available to the financial 
institutions. The development of communication and transportation infrastructure influences 
the costs of normal banking procedures. The lack of appropriate and timely legal services 
increases default risk by raising the costs and uncertainty of recovering loans. In other 
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words, some of the same general development problems which impede the production and 
raise the cost of producing other commodities and services also increase the transaction 
costs of financial intermediation. Furthermore, the poor in a low income country typically 
hold only a small amount of deposits and can effectively use only small loans so that 
financial institutions that serve rural areas and the poor must service many small accounts. 
Second, the nature and extent of financial regulations affect intermediation costs. 
The availability, characteristics, terms and conditions, and effective rates of return on 
financial instruments are greatly determined by financial regulations. Some countries, for 
example, restrict competition by creating high barriers to entry for new institutions, by 
setting prices (interest rates) for many financial instruments and services, and by restricting 
some institutions from offering some services. Taxes are often set at high levels for profits 
on financial services because of the relative ease of revenue collection. Likewise, high 
reserve requirements, justified on the grounds of financial safety but actually used to finance 
government deficits, also raise intermediation costs. Subsidized interest rates on loans for 
priority sectors raise interest costs for non-priority borrowers. Loan quotas and targets often 
require institutions to allocate larger-than-optimum amounts of funds to high-cost high-risk 
borrowers while more severely rationing low-cost low-risk ones, without receiving appropri-
ate insurance or guarantees to cover the added risk. 
Third, public development/ agricultural banks are created in many countries as 
specialized institutions to service specific clientele. Oftentimes, however, these institutions 
are too small to achieve economies of scale, and by emphasing lending they fail to achieve 
the economies of scope available by offering a more balanced mix of deposit and loan 
15 
serv1ces. They also miss the information that is available to a lender through servicing a 
potential borrower's deposit accounts. On the other hand, banks that aggressively mobilize 
rural deposits may hesitate to make what are perceived as small risky rural loans. Govern-
ment targeting of these loans may contribute to low loan recovery. 
Fourth, many financial institutions are just not managed verywell and do not actively 
search for cost-reducing technologies and innovations. Part of the explanation is the nature 
of government regulations which prompt institutions to engage in regulatory avoidance that 
often increases costs (Kane). Another reason is that many institutions are state owned and 
are burdened by cost-increasing bureaucratic procedures and attitudes, and are expected to 
serve as a source of public employment. Labor costs are high relative to low levels of 
productivity. Internal operations are inefficient and costly while increasing the transaction 
costs for clients. 
REDUCING TRANSACTION COSTS OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
The reduction in transaction costs of financial intermediation in developing countries 
requires improving information systems, reducing financial regulations, and implementing 
risk reducing mechanisms so that procedures and practices in financial transactions can be 
streamlined and simplified. Several types of improvements both external and internal to 
financial intermediaries are suggested below along with some examples of how they are 
being implemented in selected countries. 
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Improve the Economic Environment 
Several types of improvements in economic environment can contribute to reducing 
transaction costs for financial intermediaries. Improved transportation and communication 
systems can help increase the efficiency of financial institutions, especially those with large 
nation-wide branch networks in which information, personnel, and funds must move long 
distances. Improved market intelligence and price forecasting will help both borrowers and 
bankers to better project the returns and risks associated with different types of investment 
projects. Any improvements in agricultural production and marketing which translate into 
higher, more stable agricultural incomes will make farmer-borrowers more attractive, less 
risky customers for loan and deposit services. For this reason, the macroeconomic policy 
adjustments taking place in many developing countries should eventually lead to a better 
banking environment generally and especially in rural areas. 
One important area of economic environment which still requires great attention in 
many countries concerns the development of information systems for use in compiling and 
disseminating information needed by lenders to screen borrowers. Improvements are also 
needed in the systems used to identify, describe, and transfer real estate and ·personal 
property offered as loan collateral. Finally, legal systems need streamlining so that in the 
case of default lenders can expeditiously foreclose on and dispose of property pledged as 
loan collateral. It is quite common now for institutions to carry collateralized delinquent 
loans for long periods because of the high costs and long delays experienced in trying to 
prosecute borrowers. It may be true, as often argued, that most borrowers eventually pay 
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most of their obligations but the income received may not compensate for the transaction 
costs lenders incur in collecting it. 
Improve Banking Regulations 
Interest rate controls are the single most important banking regulation that must be 
examined in many countries. Frequently lending rates are fixed at sub-equilibrium levels 
in an attempt to benefit borrowers, especially small farmers, with cheap credit. This policy 
implies, however, that the financial institutions cannot recover the full cost of lending to that 
particular client group, and must ration customers because of the excess demand caused by 
the controls. 2 This rationing is often accomplished by creating additional procedures and 
delays in loan processing which raise transaction costs. Borrower transaction costs are also 
increased when lenders transfer to borrowers the costs associated with obtaining documents 
and processing loan papers. The economies of scale that could be achieved if the lender 
handled these tasks are lost when the lender cannot charge enough interest to cover the 
costs. Cuevas (1984) discovered that borrowing costs and interest rates were negatively 
correlated in Honduras suggesting that as interest rates were allowed to rise the lenders 
found ways to improve lending efficiency for the borrower. Likewise, in a study in Costa 
Rica, Gonzalez-Vega and Gonzalez-Garita found that for small loans of U.S. $200, a 
reduction of interest rates of one percentage point was accompanied by an increase in non-
interest borrowing costs of 5.5 points. 
2 A detailed discussion of how the Iron Law of Interest Rate Restrictions explains the 
concentration of loans is found in Gonzalez-Vega. 
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Controlled lending rates also have a negative effect on deposit mobilization. 
Although it is difficult to conclusively prove, there is evidence that suggests depositors are 
sensitive to interest rate changes (Meyer). If lending rates are low, the correspondingly low 
deposit rates discourage depositors and financial institutions are forced to rely on external 
funds from the central bank and, frequently, donors. Although these sources appear to be 
cheap because they usually carry subsidized rates, they may actually be quite expensive. 
Graham and Cuevas found that a private bank in Honduras experienced lending costs of 
3.13 percent using own funds versus 7.82 percent for similar loans made through a World 
Bank credit project. 
Regulations requiring large taxes on financial transactions and high reserve require-
ments tend to raise intermediation costs. In the Philippines, for example, the government 
taxes loans and collects a withholding tax on interest income earned on time and savings 
deposits. Tolentino has argued that these taxes should be reduced or eliminated in order 
to reduce intermediation costs. Reserve requirements of 25 to 30 percent are common in 
developing countries. Rates this high can hardly be justified as necessary for prudent 
financial management; their real purpose is usually to. raise funds to cover government 
deficits. But they introduce deadweight losses which result in increased costs of funds 
mobilized, and these costs must be passed on to depositors in the form of lower deposit 
rates and/ or to borrowers in the form of higher lending rates. 
Several types of regulations restrict entry and thereby reduce competition among 
financial institutions. For example, until 1984 the agricultural bank in the Dominican 
Republic (Banco Agricola) was denied authorization to mobilize deposits even though it had 
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a large branch network (Guerrero). When it was allowed to accept deposits and achieve 
the related economies of scope, it was able to do so with only a small increase in personal 
and operating costs. 
Banking regulations in the Philippines require that unit rural banks must purchase 
special five-year government securities worth 500,000 pesos for each branch opened. Other 
types of banks face even steeper requirements (Lamberte and Lim). This reduces their 
incentive to take over banks that are failing, or to open new banks in rural areas. Further-
more, the Central Bank classifies the country into service areas, and licenses are denied to 
banks desiring to operate in areas defined as over-banked. It is argued, however, that banks 
willing to risk their own capital are in a better position than bank regulators to decide which 
areas have the potential business to justify more banks (Chan). 
Reduce Risks 
One of the important reasons often given by financial institutions for not making 
more loans to agriculture, to low income households, and to small businesses is the percep-
tion of the high risks associated with these borrowers. The default rates reported in Table 
3 suggest that in fact some of the clientele groups that are identified as high priority for 
financial assistance in developing countries contribute to high default rates. 
Loan insurance and guarantee funds are the traditional ways used to attempt to 
reduce the risk element of transaction costs for financial institutions. It is expected that the 
additional fees and administrative costs these schemes impose on lenders and borrowers will 
be more than offset by a reduction in risk and an expansion in lending to priority clientele 
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groups. In practice, however, publically funded schemes do not seem to have lived up to 
expectations, particularly in terms of additionality in lending (Levitsky and Prasad; Magno 
and Meyer). For a guarantee to be successful, financial institutions should lend more to 
customers not normally served by the lenders, but still insure that the institutions employ 
sound methods in screening applicants and supervising loans in order to minimize risks. 
Two problems have frequently reduced the effectiveness of guarantees. First, commercial 
banks have had little faith that publically funded schemes would actually meet claims for 
losses or do so at reasonable administrative costs, so they have refused to participate in the 
programs. Second, some institutions have participated by continuing to lend to their 
previous customers who fall within the population targeted by the guarantee, but use any 
liquidity generated through the guarantee to expand lending to nontargeted clients. 
Therefore there is little additionality in lending. 
Mutual guarantee associations in which a number of households/ enterprises make 
payments to form a cooperative or association to guarantee loans taken by members are a 
variant of the guarantee model that holds some promise, particularly among artisans and 
microenterprises. These associations may also participate in two-stage loan guarantee 
schemes in which a counter guarantee fund shares part of the risk and helps increase and 
stabilize the self-help potential of the association (von Stockhausen). This concept is being 
I 
actively promoted in Asia by APRACA (~ian and Pacific Regional Agricultural Credit 
Association) in projects designed to link financial self-help groups with formal financial 
institutions (Seibel and Parhusip ). The groups accumulate savings that are deposited in the 
financial institutions that make loans to group members. The joint liability of the group 
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members covers the balance of the loan risk for loans made to members without collateral. 
This type of group scheme is also expected to reduce borrowing costs for its members, 
besides giving them access to loans otherwise denied to them. Organizing and participating 
in these groups, however, can represent fairly high transaction costs in itself. 
Diversify Financial Institutions 
I 
Many financial institutions were created during the 1960s and 1970s as specialized 
lending institutions. They were designed to complement or substitute for the commercial 
banks that were perceived as being too risk averse to engage in large scale lending to 
priority clientele groups. A characteristic of these institutions is that only rarely did they 
engage in significant deposit mobilization. More frequently, they relied on subsidized 
external funds. This also occurred with many credit unions in Latin America that originally 
relied upon their own funds but gradually increased their dependency on external funds. 
The empirical data presented in Table 1 suggest that many institutions could achieve 
economies of scope by balancing the services provided. In the case of the specialized 
lending institutions, this usually implies expanding deposit mobilization. For commercial 
banks, it may mean expanding loans relative to deposits. The initial results of the experi-
ment by Banco Agricola in the Dominican Republic to begin taking deposits shows the wide 
scope for adding this banking service at little additional cost to the bank. 
The institutions that begin to mobilize deposits may find that they reap several 
benefits. First, the present external funds that appear to be cheap may actually be quite 
expensive when transaction costs are defined to include the reporting and administrative 
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costs the donors and central banks usually require for utilizing their funds. An extreme 
example in Bangladesh was the bank that developed a form with almost 150 different rows 
for use in reporting on the many different lines of credit and loan purposes that the 
government and donors considered important. Furthermore, external funds are not com-
pletely risk free for a lender interested in establishing itself as a dependable long term 
financial institution for its customers. However, with the ebbs and flows in interest and 
funds of donors and the government, an institution may at one time find itself awash in 
funds, but starved at another time. 
Second, a financial institution that has an active deposit relationship with a customer 
can accumulate information about that customers' reliability, cash flows, and savings 
potential. That information may be useful when the institution appraises the customer's 
future loan application. 
Third, deposit mobilization may contribute to superior loan recovery. Specialized 
lending institutions often are under pressure to meet loan targets so they may not be as 
careful in sorting and screening borrowers and projects as they should be. Often political 
pressure is used to influence who gets a loan and who must repay. When the funds come 
from the government, the borrower may conclude that it is really a grant so repayment is 
not required. By lending funds that have been mobilized from depositors, the financiai 
institutions know they must be more careful in making loans, they are more likely to be able 
to avoid political pressure in loan allocations, and borrowers may be more inclined to repay 
loans that they know represent their neighbors' deposits. The link between deposit mobili-
zation and loans was demonstrated in a credit union rehabilitation project in the Dominican 
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Republic. Raising interest rates and savings promotion campaigns caused a dramatic 
increase in deposits. Furthermore, delinquency declined from 71 to 10 percent in one credit 
union, from 48 to 7 percent in a second, and from 45 to 15 percent in a third (Gonzalez-
Vega and Poyo ). 
Expand the Banking Network 
An expansion of the banking network can have two possible benefits for bank 
customers. First, if the number of banks (or branches) expand, there is greater likelihood 
of competition among institutions in the variety and efficiency of the banking services 
offered. Second, if the new banking units are widely scattered geographically, the transac-
tion costs for borrowers and depositors should fall because of reductions in the costs and 
time required for banking. 
Encouraging bank expansion is largely a matter of regulations. When interest rates 
are controlled for rural loans or loans to small enterprises and when capital and other 
requirements for new entrants into banking are high, the expansion of banking to service 
priority customers and to increase competition is retarded. The evidence presented above 
on possible economies of scale in banking, however, raises the issue of trade-off between 
bank and customer transaction costs. The creation of many small banks/branches that 
reduce customer transaction costs may do so at the expense of increased transaction costs 
for the institutions themselves. In these cases, it may be necessary to utilize less formal 
arrangements, such as self-help groups and credit unions, to reach customers that would be 
too expensive for larger, more formal institutions such as full service banks. 
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Group Lending 
Group lending is often recommended as a way to reduce transaction costs. At least 
five advantages are claimed for group lending {Adams and Ladman). For the lender, 1) 
default risks are reduced because of joint liability, 2) loan transaction costs are reduced per 
unit of money lent by making one large loan to the group rather than several small ones to 
individuals, 3) scarce manpower can reach a larger number of clients through groups, and 
4) technical services can be provided more cheaply to a few groups than to many individuals. 
For the borrowers, the transaction costs per unit borrowed may be reduced compared to 
individual loans. 
It is not clear, however, how frequently these supposed benefits for group lending are 
actually realized in practice. Adams and Pablo Romero analyzed the Dominican Republic 
Development Foundation program of small farmer lending and found that loan recovery was 
not good in spite of group lending. On the other hand, the well-known Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh has successfully utilized the small group approach to reach thousands of 
members and achieve loan recovery greater than 95 percent (Hossain). But other micro-
enterprise lending programs in Bangladesh, using some of the same principles, experience 
less success in recovery (Hoque and Ahmed). Solidarity groups are widely used in Latin 
America to organize five to eight women into groups to participate in a program of credit 
and training (Otero). 
One of the problems faced in analyzing transaction costs of lenders and borrowers 
is that there are no studies that carefully compare group versus individual lending. For 
example, the transaction costs of the Grameen Bank appear to be high, but loan sizes are 
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small compared to the loans given by commercial banks. As noted in Table 3, however, the 
commercial banks have a high default rate. These differences imply a trade-off between 
careful loan screening and supervision versus loan default. 
Huppi and Feder conducted a comprehensive review of group lending and credit 
cooperative experience and found many examples that failed to live up to expectations. No 
clear pattern of reduced costs or improved loan recovery emerged. Group formation costs 
were high in many cases. They concluded, however, that most of the unsuccessful experienc-
es are due to shortcomings in their implementation and complementary activities rather than 
an inadequacy of the approaches themselves. They believe these lending arrangements hold 
potential to improve small farmer access to credit while improving the viability of financial 
intermediaries. Therefore it seems that group arrangements offer no panacea for reducing 
transaction costs. Each must be carefully designed for the unique circumstances of each 
country, and alone they cannot overcome the problems of an inhospitable economic 
environment. 
Improve Internal Operations 
Banking institutions that actively seek ways to reduce costs and risks can often 
discover innovations that improve their performance, yet provide fmancial services to 
clientele groups that other institutions find too costly or risky to serve. The Syndicate Bank 
experience in Manipal, India provides an interesting example of a bank that was able to 
successfully grow and prosper by developing fmancial services for a new group of customers, 
namely the small and medium enterprises that had been shunned by larger, city-based banks 
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(Bhatt). The key to the Syndicate Bank success was the cultivation of the habit of thrift in 
the community through the pigmy deposit scheme. This scheme was introduced in 1928 to 
collect very small deposits door to door at stated intervals from a large number of relatively 
uneducated and poor customers. The concept relied on the idea that many poor people 
could save small amounts but did not have time to go to a bank and deposit this amount 
regularly (i.e. the transaction costs were too high). Bank agents were commissioned to 
collect these deposits, and received a fee not exceeding three percent per year based on the 
amount of deposits collected. The interest was 3.13 percent per year if the saver did not 
withdraw from the scheme for seven years. Within this period, the saver could borrow 
against the security of the deposit. On the average, the total cost to the bank for this long-
term deposit has varied between three and ~ye percent, significantly lower than the cost of 
a three or five year fixed deposit. 
Another innovative feature of the Syndicate Bank was its reduction in information 
costs by the recruitment of relatively unsophisticated local people.. They have familiarity 
with the local scene and their contacts enable them to expand Syndicate business because 
they inspire confidence in potential depositors, are able to appraise the soundness of 
projects and the creditworthiness of borrowers, and can assess the business potential of the 
local area. Staff persons without this background would have to collect more information 
and spend more time appraising borrowers and their projects. 
By recruiting local persons and promoting the very best, the Bank has been able to 
hold down costs and achieve high productivity. Average salaries per employee are 20 to 30 
percent lower than that of larger city banks. However, the employees handle an average 
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of 287 deposit accounts per employee compared to 120 for the banking system as a whole, 
and 48 loan accounts compared to 14 for the banking system. 
The Bank provides technical assistance to farmers and small industries through a 
special staff. The bank's policy of opening branches in a cluster permits each of these 
technical assistance officers to handle five to ten branches. The technical assistance helps 
the borrowers, but also helps the bank enlarge its business and reduce its risk. 
Operating costs are reduced through decentralized decision making. Loans to 
farmers and small enterprises are sanctioned by the branch managers with the advice of the 
technical staff. There is no reference to the head office so head office costs are low. The 
branch and branch manager are evaluated on the volume of deposits, volume of loans and 
loan recovery. Reporting procedures are confmed to collecting and documenting informa-
tion relevant for decision making either at the branch or the head office. 
Some financial institutions are adopting a cost-reducing technological approach to 
reducing intermediation costs. Banks in more developed countries· are beginning to adopt 
techniques used in high income countries such as automated teller machines and drive-
through banking facilities. A promising innovation is the interesting FAO-initiated micro-
banker concept pioneered by Ralph Houtman which is being implemented by APRACA in 
several Asian countries (Shrestha). The Cooperative Rural Bank of Bulacan in the Philip-
pines was the first pilot site inaugurated in May 1988. It had approximately 2,500 customers. 
Most of its 900 borrowers were small farmers, shopkeepers, and market vendors. The total 
deposits of about $143,000 and a loan portfolio of $276,000 are managed by a total staff of 
11 persons. Loans made recently are performing well, while a large part of the arrears are 
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due to overlending of government funds in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The Bank's 
microcomputer is used to manage the deposit accounts, develop lists of past due loans, print 
demand letters, prepare ad hoc reports, and generally rationalize the Bank's daily office 
routine. As a result, the staff have been redeployed to field operations, such as collecting 
past due loans, so that collections and bank profits have risen, and the accumulated losses 
are expected to be eventually wiped out. 
In Thailand, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) is also 
testing the microcomputer concept. BAAC is experimenting with Micro Branches, the 
establishment of a relatively dense network of small offices staffed by six to eight staff only 
two of which will be full time in the office due to the microcomputer efficiencies. The 
others will be in the field, visiting farmers, appraising and collecting loans, and promoting 
the saving habit. This approach is aimed at improving customer service and creating a 
strong relationship between the bank and its customers. It is also likely to strengthen the 
savings mobilization strategy now implemented by BAAC to complement its historic 
emphasis on lending. An important dimension of the BAAC experiment is the substitution 
of a computer generated voucher for the traditional savings passbook. Full computer 
vouchering to eventually replace cash in/ out slips will further reduce the bank's transaction 
costs (Shrestha). 
Unk Informal Finance with Formal Finance 
In many parts of the developing world, informal financial services provided by 
moneylenders, commodity traders, and landlords have been perceived at best as inefficient 
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and unproductive, and at worst as usurious, monopolistic, and prejudicial to rapid, broad 
based development. Savings groups and ROSCAs have been seen as mere precursors to 
more formal credit unions. Pawnshops have been viewed simply as sources of high priced 
consumer credit for the urban poor. This negative view of informal finance is being 
replaced by a more positive interpretation, especially in light of the major problems 
experienced by formal financial institutions in developing countries (Adams, 1989). There 
is recognition of the fact that the practices and technologies that contribute to the strengths 
and advantages of informal finance, often in spite of many efforts to replace it, may give 
suggestions about how to improve formal finance. There is also greater recognition for the 
need to tap the strengths of informal finance by linking it with formal finance. 
By linking informal with formal finance, all the participants in financial transactions 
may experience a reduction in transaction costs, and/ or there may be a transfer in transac-
tion costs from the participant less able to absorb them (usually the financial institution) to 
the one more able to do so (usually the borrower or saver). Linking savings clubs with 
financial institutions, such as is being done in Zimbabwe with great success (Chimedza), 
represents an example largely oriented towards savings. These clubs are formed mostly by 
small groups of peasant farmers from the same village or cluster of villages. The average 
size of a club is 35, many of the members are women and some are composed of extended 
family members. The current membership is approximately 200,000 people in about 5,700 
clubs. An important factor bringing the members together is their desire to save money as 
an alternative to the use of agricultural credit, which in most cases is unavailable to them. 
The members agree to make regular deposits at the club's periodic meetings. Stamps are 
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placed in savings books to represent the savings deposits. Since the meetings are held at 
a local site, the members are saved the transaction costs of personally maintaining a bank 
account in a distant bank. Instead, the club's treasurer makes the deposits on behalf of the 
members. The savings are then available in the future for either individual or group 
projects. Through group interaction, the club members are encouraged to make regular 
savings and to identify productive uses for their savings. 
As noted above, the self-help groups being formed in Asia as well as the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh also encourage savings and probably reduce member transaction costs 
for savings. But these groups also emphasize increasing access . to loans through the 
guarantees offered by the group's deposits and by joint liability among the members. 
Another way that the informal sector can be linked to the formal sector is through 
the lending activities of crop traders, input suppliers, and landlords (Esguerra and Meyer). 
These informal lenders already are responsible for a large amount of rural lending with their 
own savings or with funds obtained through their formal loans. For example, Larson found 
that 4 7 percent of the corn traders in southern Philippines provided cash advances to 
farmers and 26 percent sold production inputs on credit. The majority of the firms reported 
that 60 percent of their funds came from bank loans using urban real estate as collateral, 
and the remaining 40 percent came from equity capital. 
The Philippines government has recognized the role that traders play in providing 
financial services and the National Agricultural Productivity Program (NAPP) has provided 
credit to agriculture using informal lenders as conduits (Esguerra). Loans are made by 
participating banks to traders, millers, input suppliers and users of farm produce for food 
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or animal feed. These borrowers in turn make cash or kind loans to farmers who forward 
contract their production to them. The possible advantages to the farmers are reduced 
transaction costs, and an assured supply of inputs and market for their products. There is 
no evidence available, however, to answer the important question of whether or not small 
farmers achieved much benefit from the program, or if the informal· sector lenders simply 
used the funds obtained to make loans to their regular preferred clientele. 
One of the ways that formal institutions attempt to reduce transaction costs for rural 
borrowers, yet avoid the expense of developing a network of full-service bank branches, is 
to create mobile units or mini bank branches. A recent APRACA meeting reviewed the 
experience of several Asian countries that are experimenting with these ideas. The innova-
tions discussed appear to reduce transaction costs to clients by reducing geographic distance, 
but it was unclear if they reduced the psychological distance between bank and client. The 
cost accounting practices used did not permit a comparative analysis of lending costs 
between a regular branch and these special units (APRACA). 
Pawnbroking has frequently carried the stigma of usury and exploitation of the poor 
but research in India and Sri Lanka has revealed some of the reasons for its continuous 
popularity (Bouman and Houtman). Both legal and illegal pawnbroking have expanded in 
some areas. Although the transaction costs of getting a pawnbroking loan from some of the 
formal lenders that engage in pawnbroking may be fairly high, they are relatively low for 
small loans compared to subsidized formal loans. Borrowers often turn to unlicensed 
pawnbrokers because the transaction costs are lower, the service speedier and more discrete, 
and business hours are more convenient. Pawnbroking seems to be especially prominent 
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in South Asia where an active market exists for gold and silver. Some banks refinance 
private pawnbrokers so this represents a possible way to reach poor households indirectly 
through formal institutions.3 There will likely be more opportunities to expand pawn-
braking and to incorporate pawnbroking operations into formal financial institutions when 
pawnbroking expands to cover a broader range of pawnable assets. This innovation is one 
that deserves more consideration by formal intermediaries. 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DONORS 
The demise of many specialized agricultural lenders, the large amount of arrears in 
many others, and the large transaction costs that exist for borrowers, depositors, and 
financial institutions in many countries suggest a need for the continuation and expansion 
of the reforms that have begun in many financial institutions. Furthermore, the ubiquitous 
nature of informal finance and its resilience in the face of adverse regulations and economic 
environment suggest that it has successfully employed techniques and innovations that may 
be worthy of emulation by the formal sector. Donors have an opportunity to contribute to 
the search for innovations in financial intermediation that will reduce costs to all partici-
pants and contribute to the viability of financial institutions in developing countries. This 
section identifies and briefly describes some of these opportunities. 
A number of developing countries began to liberalize their financial systems during 
the past decade (World Bank). These reforms have often included greater flexibility in the 
3 Lamberte found that pawnbrokers in Manila borrowed a larger amount of funds from 
banks than they deposited with banks. 
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setting of interest rates, a reduction in interest rate subsidies, fewer controls on credit 
allocation, more reliance on deposit mobilization, and the privatization of some financial 
institutions. The experiences of some of these countries, such as Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay in Latin America and Indonesia and the Philippines in Asia, show that liberal-
ization is fraught with complexity. Donors can help developing countries to analyze and 
understand the macroeconomic issues that influence successful financial sector reform and 
that determine the appropriate sequencing of reforms in the real and financial sectors. 
More importantly, donors can help develop adequate prudential regulation and banking 
supervision to avoid recklessness and fraud when controls are eased. Assistance can also 
be directed at assistance in the development of interest rate and credit allocation policies 
in a liberalized regime, and in restructuring insolvent and unviable institutions (Popiel; Roe 
and Popiel). 
Donors also have to analyze the policies they use in conjunction with their resource 
transfer programs and projects in developing countries. As noted above, the reporting 
requirements of donors often greatly increase an institution's administrative costs, yet add 
little knowledge to improve the institution's management. Donor credit projects that tightly 
target specific clientele groups for loans can increase a financial institution's portfolio risk 
while guarantee programs may contribute little to reducing this risk. More attention should 
~ 
be given by donors to the impact of their projects on the viability of the financial institutions 
rather than focusing exclusively on the hard-to-measure issue of project impact on the 
beneficiary (Adams, 1988). 
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Through technical assistance and training programs, donors have an opportunity to 
assist developing countries with the following institution and country specific issues related 
to the costs of financial intermediation: 
1. Design a methodology to systematically collect information on transaction costs, and 
monitor these costs over time as an indicator of efficiency in financial intermediation. 
2. Identify specific innovations and improvements needed in a country to support 
efficient financial intermediation, such as a streamlined legal system, better informa-
tion exchange between financial institutions, and improved management information 
systems that provide regulatory and supervisory authorities with the minimum 
information needed on a timely basis about the fmancial system. 
3. Conduct experiments on specific innovations, document the results, and facilitate 
information exchange about the results of successful experiments on ideas such as: 
a. The application of microcomputers, mini and mobil banks, and other cost-
reducing technologies in banking. 
b. The appropriate institutional design and incentive structures so that the 
utilization of groups will effectively reduce costs and risks in mobilizing 
deposits, making loans and communicating and collecting information. 
c. The introduction of additional ways to link formal with informal finance such 
as setting up pawnshops in banks or upgrading large informal groups into 
credit unions or banks, and ways of improving informal finance such as 
developing lines of wholesale credit for traders and lenders or creating central 
liquidity funds to ease the liquidity problems of credit unions. 
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Finally, donors can use some of their resources to fund the social costs of improved 
financial intermediation that cannot be easily recovered by financial institutions themselves. 
These costs may involve setting up training courses and institutions for training bank staff 
in their new responsibilities in liberalized banking, in training borrowers and savers about 
the practices of formal financial institutions, and in training central bank staff in the proper 
role of regulation and supervision in a liberalized financial system. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Transaction costs for financial intermediation are often high in developing countries. 
Recent empirical research has measured the magnitude of these costs for the participants 
in the intermediation process. The findings show that economies of scope are often 
available for financial institutions to employ a more balanced combination of deposit and 
loan outputs. Some institutions may also experience economies of scale so costs can be 
reduced by adjusting average bank/branch size. A trade-off may exist in some countries 
between increasing branch size to reduce costs for the financial institution versus expanding 
the network of small branches to reduce transaction costs for bank customers. The default 
costs are so high for some intermediaries that they swamp other operating costs. This 
implies that improved loan screening, monitoring, and supervision are required. 
High transaction costs are affected by a country's general level of development, by 
the nature and incidence of financial regulation, by emphasizing lending through specialized 
institutions that mobilize few deposits and are too smalllo achieve economies of scale, and 
by poor management and a failure to adopt cost-reducing technologies and innovations. 
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These problems suggest a number of ways to reduce transaction costs ranging from improv-
ing the general economic environment in which financial institutions operate to adopting 
specific ideas found useful in some countries. 
Donors can play a role in helping to reduce transaction costs. First, they can help 
countries manage the macroeconomic complexities that have emerged in countries that have 
already undertaken finance reforms. Second, they can review their own programs and 
projects to see how they contribute to costs and risks of financial intermediation. Finally, 
they can use their technical assistance and training opportunities to experiment with 
innovations, and disseminate information about the most promising ones. 
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Table 1 
Economies of Scale and cost Shares of Loans and Deposits 
in Selected Case Studies 
Economies of Scale Cost of Deposit 
Case Studies Overall Partial Costs of Lending Mobilization 
Loans Deposits Average Marginal Average Marginal 
% % % % 
Bangladesh 
Nationalized 
Commercial Banks 
Agrani 0.95 0.34 0.61 356 1.21 3.90 2.37 
Janata 0.90* 0.39 050 3.02 1.19 2.46 1.24 
Rupali 0.98 0.36 0.63 3.78 1.35 2.41 151 
Son ali 0.77* 0.43 0.34 1.% 0.84 1.29 0.44 
Public Development Bank 0.66* 052 0.14 0.89 0.46 2.33 0.34 
Honduras 
Public Development Bank 1.08 0.77 0.31 10.02 7.64 8.78 2.72 
Private Commercial Bank 159 0.39 1.20 3.39 1.69 5.33 6.71 
Dominican Republic 
Public Development Bank 051* 050 O.ot 8.81 4.43 9.11 0.09 
Sources: Bangladesh - Srinivasan, 1988, 
Honduras - Cuevas, 1984, 
Dominican Republic - Cuevas and Poyo, 1986. 
* Significantly less than one. 
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TABLE2 
Costs of Loan Administration Estimated in Selected Case Studies 
for Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Loans. Average Costs 
in Percent of the Loan Amount, by Type of Loan 
Non-Agr. 
Case Studies Agr. Loans Loans 
% % 
Bangladesh8-' Nationalized Commercial 
Banks (weighted average) 
Public Development Bank (BKB) 
Philippines A. 198Jb_/ 
Public Development 
Banks (weighted average) 4.2 2.7 
Private Commercial Banks 1;6 2.7 
Rural Banks 5.4 3.9 
B. 1988c-' 
Private Development Banks 
Private Commercial Banks 
Rural Banks 
Hondurasd-' Public Development Bank 
Private Commercial Bank 3.7-8.4e_l 1.0-7. 5e_l 
Dominican Republic Public Development Bankf_/ 9.3 n.a. 
Public Development Bankg_l 8.8 n.a. 
Togoh-' Public Development Bank 
HigerLI Public Development Bank 9.5 n.a. 
Footnotes on next page. 
All 
Loans 
% 
2.9 
0.9 
5.3 
4.3 
4.8 
10.0 
3.4 
9.3 
8.8 
5.3 
9.5 
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TABLE2 
Footnotes 
a/ Srinivasan, 1988. Data base: branch-level records 1983-1984. Weighted averages 
calculated by the author using the outstanding loan balances for each bank reported 
by Srinivasan. 
b./ TBAC, August 1985. Data base: banks' financial statements 1983. Weighted 
averages calculated using the shares in total loans granted in 1983. 
!;./ Untalan and Cuevas, 1988. Data base: branch-level records and field survey, 1987. 
d/ Cuevas, 1984. Data base: branch-level records 1970-1982. 
~/ Cuevas and Graham, 1984. Data base: branch-level records 1982, and field survey, 
1983. Highest cost of agricultural loans correspond to foreign-funded supervised 
loans. 
f/ Cuevas and Poyo, 1986. Data base: branch-level records 1979-1983. 
g/ Cuevas and Poyo, 1986. Data base: branch-level records 1984-1985. Deposit 
mobilization activity started in 1984 . 
.h/ Cuevas, 1987a. Data base: bank records, 1985. 
i/ Cuevas, 1987b. Data base: field surveys, household level (1985) and branch level 
(1986). 
n.a. not applicable 
TABLE 3 
Cross-country Comparison of Non-Interest Agricultural Lending Costs 
Including Risk Premia 
Case Studies 
(1) 
Default 
rate8-' 
(2) (3) (4) 
Loan Risk Total Non-
Admin. Premiab_/ Interest 
Costs Costs (2+3) 
-------------------------------------------------------- % ---------- % -------- % ---------- % -----
Bangladesh Nationalized Commercial 
Philippines 
Honduras 
Banks (weighted average) 
Public Development Bank (BKB) 
A. 1983 
Public Development 
Banks (weighted average)c-' 
Private Commercial Banks 
Rural Banks 
B. 1988 
Private Development Banks 
Private Commercial Banks 
Rural Banks 
Public Development Bank 
Private Commercial Bank 
Dominican Republic Public Development Bankd-' 
Togo Public Development Bank 
Niger Public Development Bank 
13.3 
7.3 
1.8 
2.5 
5.8 
2.5 
2.5 
5.8 
8.8 
1.3 
7.0 
9.8 
4.5 
2.9 
0.9 
4.2 
1.6 
5.4 
5.3 
4.3 
4.8 
10.0 
3.4 
8.8 
5.3 
9.5 
16.5 
8.3 
1.9 
2.7 
6.7 
2.8 
2.8 
6.7 
11.0 
1.4 
8.6 
11.9 
5.4 
19.4 
9.2 
6.1 
4.3 
12.1 
8.1 
7. 1 
11.5 
21.0 
4.8 
17.4 
17.2 
14.9 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
Footnotes on next page. 
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TABLE3 
Footnotes 
~/ Assumed equal to one-fourth of the reported past-due ratios. 
b./ Computed using the formula 
r = (d/(1-d))(1 +a+f) 
where, r is the risk premium 
d is the default rate 
a is the loan administration cost 
f is the opportunity cost of funds, assumed 5% for all cases. 
!;./ Default rate corresponds to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development 
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) taken together (see note a/ (lbove on default rates). 
Q./ Only most recent study considered for this table. 
Table 4 
Borrowing Transaction Costs at the Farm Level in Selected Countries, by Loan Size 
Country 
Transaction Costs by 
Loan Size Bangladesh Philip- Costa Ecuador Honduras Panama Peru 
pines Rica 1981 1983 
A. Transaction Costs as 
Percent of Loan Amount 
Sample Average 21.7% 1.2% 11.5% 2.8% 3.0% 3.5% 5.2% 1.2% 
Small Loans 29.4 2.4 15.6 5.3 5.9 5.7 5.7 3.9 
Medium-size Loans 17.5 0.8 4.4 2.0 1.6 3.0 3.0 1.3 
Large Loans 7.0 0.6 2.9 0.6 0.2 1.6 2.0 1.0 
B. Transaction Costs as 
Percent of Explicit-
Interest Chargesa 
Sample Average 180.8% 6.7% 84.6% 22.9% 23.1% 22.0% 46.4% 4.0% 
Small Loans 245.0 13.3 124.8 47.7 45.4 35.9 50.9 13.0 
Medium-size Loans 145.8 4.4 32.8 17.3 12.3 . 18.9 26.8 4.3 
Large Loans 58.1 3.3 17.7 4. 1 1.5 10.1 17.9 3.3 
Sources: Bangladesh - Ahmed; Philippines - Abiad; Costa Rica - Gonzalez-Garita; 
Ecuador, Panama and Peru- Inter-American Development Bank; Honduras 1981- Cuevas, 1984; 
Honduras 1983- Cuevas and Graham, 1985; Niger- Graham, Cuevas, and Negash. 
Niger 
0.9% 
5.8 
1.8 
0.5 
7.5% 
48.3 
15.0 
4.2 
a Computed as (Transaction costs/Interest charges)*100, using the explicit-interest rates reported in the different 
sources, e.g., for Bangladesh, the interest rate reported by Ahmed is 12%, hence, for the sample average, 
(21.7 /12)*100 = 180.8%. 
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